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Introduction
The Changing Practices of International Law
thomas gammeltoft-hansen and tanja aalberts
1.1 Introduction
In his seminal work, The Changing Structure of International Law, from
1964 Wolfgang Friedmann argued that international law has entered a
new phase following the end of the Second World War.1 In contrast to
the formative period of modern international law, where the prime pur-
pose of international law was to ensure co-existence and regulate conflict
among sovereign states, contemporary international law has been sup-
planted by a drive towards deeper transnational cooperation. Next to the
classical ‘international law of co-existence’ a growing ‘international law of
co-operation’ would thus emerge, concerned with topics hitherto consid-
ered ‘domestic affairs’ such as economic development, welfare and good
governance.
A cursory view at international law fifty years later largely seems to con-
firm Friedmann’s premonition, and developments in many areas clearly
exceed his expectations. The twentieth century has seen an almost expo-
nential growth in multilateral treaties, the multiplication of specialized
legal regimes and international institutions taking on a much more per-
vasive role in international relations.
What is sometimes referred to as the ‘legalization of world politics’ cov-
ers several distinct but related developments at the empirical level. The
first is themultiplication of actors, or subjects, of international law. By this
we mean, first, the increasing number of states participating in the inter-
national legal system. The emergence of a range of new states following the
end of colonial rule and again following the end of theColdWar hasmeant
1 Wolfgang Friedmann, The Changing Structure of International Law (London: Stevens &
Sons, 1964).
1
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a horizontal or geographical expansion of international law from predom-
inantlyWestern nations to a host of new states. Secondly, the proliferation
of international organizations, transnational corporate entities and other
non-state actors has increasingly challenged the notion of sovereign states
as the exclusive subjects of international law. We may thus identify a sim-
ilar vertical or functional expansion of international law as international
organizations, corporations and individuals are increasingly recognized as
parties to instruments and subjects of international lawwithin such varied
areas as international criminal law, trade law and human rights.
The second, parallel, development is the expansion of treaty law. Since
the end of the Second World War, the world has seen a radical expanse
of international legal agreements. The UN Treaty Collection currently
counts more than 158 000 treaties and subsequent actions.2 In some areas,
political cooperation has extended a web of bilateral agreements; over the
past quarter-century, the number of bilateral investment treaties has thus
grown almost ten-fold to almost 3000.3 Perhaps more significant, more
than 6000 multilateral treaties have been signed since the beginning of
the twentieth century.4 Of these 30 per cent are general in nature and
thus open for all states to sign.5 Many of these treaties govern issues qual-
itatively different from the traditional international law of co-existence,
challenging traditional conceptions of state sovereignty based on a sepa-
ration of internal and external affairs. From trade law, to human rights, to
environmental law, the growing international law of cooperation presup-
poses a fundamentally different commitment of participating states to cor-
respondingly adjust domestic affairs as well as a shift of lawmaking powers
towards international organizations and other non-state actors.
Thirdly, international law has been backed by much broader and
stronger panoply of international judicial institutions, coupled to an
2 Available online at http://treaties.un.org.
3 http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA. As of 25 May 2017, there are 2960 bilateral
investment treaties. In addition, there are 303 other treaties with investment provisions (e.g.
free trade agreements). See www.unctad.org.
4 A development that seems to have slowed down somewhat the last two decades.
5 ILC Analytical Study 2006, ILC Study Group on the Fragmentation of International Law.
Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and
Expansion of International Law; Report of the Study Group of the International Law Com-
mission, Finalized by Martti Koskenniemi. UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 and Add.1 and Corr. 1.
New York: International Law Commission, 2006; Christopher J. Borgen, ‘Resolving Treaty
Conflicts’ (2005) 37 George Washington International Law Review 57–80; Charlotte Ku,
Global Governance and the Changing Face of International Law, ACUNS Keynote Paper
(2001–2).
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expansion and increasing overlap of their respective jurisdictions. With
some 125 international judiciary institutions,6 international law today is
no longer the ‘law without courts’ as Hugo Grotius once described it.7
Moreover, over the last decades the International Court of Justice has
found violations in a number of controversial and security and human
rights related cases.8 The reach and case load of regional courts, such the
European Court of Justice, and the regional human rights courts have
similarly expanded; the European Court of Human Rights alone receives
around 60 000 applications and issues some 1500 substantive judgments
annually.9 This growing adjudication is partly a result of the two trends
above. The ratification of UNCLOS,WTO, NAFTA and the Energy Char-
ter Treaty has each brought with them specialized adjudicatory and dis-
pute resolutionmechanisms, many of them encompassing powerful states
that have traditionally avoided submitting to international jurisdiction.10
The expansion in treaty law, such as bilateral investment treaties, has also
led to a slew of interstate arbitrations before the Permanent Court of Arbi-
tration (PCA). Yet, today the PCA also provides dispute resolution ser-
vices in cases involving claims involving non-state actors such as transna-
tional corporations. Similarly, new protocols have expanded the right to
individual petition under a number of human rights treaties. Perhapsmost
noteworthy a host of new adjudicatorymechanisms has emerged since the
1990s. The two ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and
the former Yugoslavia were succeeded by the establishment of the Inter-
national Criminal Court.
In addition to these trends of expansion, the different components of
international law arguably display a higher degree of both political and
judicial interdependence than Friedmann foresaw. In the context of the
proliferation of specialized regimes, it is noteworthy that both legal instru-
ments themselves and international legal institutions often make cross-
references to other treaties and institutions. This is visible at the judicial
level as well. Not only do different regional human rights courts cite each
6 Calculation from the Project on International Courts andTribunals, available at www.pict-
pcti.org.
7 Benedict Kingsbury, ‘International Courts: Uneven Judicialisation in Global Order’, in
James Crawford andMartti Koskenniemi (eds), The Cambridge Companion to Interntional
Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 203–27.
8 Malcolm Langford, ‘The New Apologists: The International Court of Justice and Human
Rights’ (2015) 48(1) Retfærd 49–78.
9 Kingsbury, ‘International Courts’, 208.
10 J. H. H. Weiler et al., ‘Special Issue: Changing Paradigms in International Law’ (2009) 20
European Journal of International Law 21–109.
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other, the appointment of prominent human rights lawyers to the Inter-
national Court of Justice has arguably lend a stronger human rights pro-
file to this institution as well.11 Inter-operation equally works to break
down the national-international divide.12 Legislation allowing for uni-
versal jurisdiction in criminal cases and domestic incorporation of e.g.
human rights instruments have allowed national institutions to play a
muchmore decisive role in enforcing international law, andmany national
courts have becomemore confident to interpret and refer to international
legal instruments.13
At the political level, different bodies of international law today inter-
act to an extent where it becomes difficult to disentangle formally separate
legal commitments. Recent suggestions have been made by some coun-
tries to renegotiate the 1951 Refugee Convention, yet the corner-stone of
that instrument – the principle of non-refoulement – is enshrined in, or
follows from, numerous other international and regional human rights
treaties. AmongEUMember States, anymove to step down from theEuro-
pean Convention on Human Rights would further have political reper-
cussions within the EU system, and informally the Strasbourg and Brus-
sels Courts are clearly doing much to coordinate and avoid adjudicative
conflicts. Interdependence is also evident at the level of treaty law, where
cross-referencing multilateral obligations is becoming increasingly com-
monplace as part of bilateral agreements. Thus, foreign investment treaties
may require the signing state to legally and politically commit to interna-
tional standards in a wide range of other areas in order to secure a stable
investment environment. States choosing to completely ignore property
rights, labour laws and good governance principles thus ultimately risk
financial isolation.14
Last, but not least, this changing landscape of international law clearly
impacts its subjects. A number of scholars have pointed to the fact that
the international law of cooperation and increasing powers granted to
11 Rosalyn Higgins, ‘Human Rights in the International Court of Justice’ (2007) 20 Leiden
Journal of International Law 745–751, at 746.
12 André Nollkaemper, ‘Inside or Out: Two Types of International Legal Pluralism’, in Jan
Klabbers and Touko Piiparinen (eds), Normative Pluralism and International Law: Explor-
ing Global Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 94–142.
13 Kingsbury, ‘International Courts’, 222; B. S. Chimni, ‘Legitimating the International Rule
of Law’, in James Crawford and Martti Koskenniemi (eds), The Cambridge Companion to
Interntional Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 290–308, at 296.
14 H. R. Fabri, ‘Regulating Trade, Investments and Money’, in J. Crawford and M. Kosken-
niemi (eds), The Cambridge Companion to International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2012), 352–372, at 359.
available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108349420.002
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Vrije Universiteit, on 15 Dec 2020 at 12:19:14, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use,
introduction 5
international legal institutions are undercutting national sovereignty and
marginalizing the role of states as singular actors in the international legal
field. In today’s world, trans-governmental regulatory organizations,15
transnational corporations16 and NGOs17 are becoming increasingly
important actors in the development and governing of international
law.
This normative thickening and expansion of law at all levels of inter-
national life has led some scholars to suggest that we live in an unprece-
dented era of ‘legalization’.18 This concept was originally forwarded as
part of a particular theoretical framework, carrying with it a number of
both analytical and normative assumptions with which we do not neces-
sarily agree.19 We use it here as a purely descriptive term. Legalization, in
other words, is employed as a short-hand for the different developments in
regard to international law described above. That across issue areas, resort
to international law and institutions has become an ‘ubiquitous presence’
in political, academic and public discourse.20 This empirical observation
is shared by international lawyers across a wide range of theoretical posi-
tions. As David Kennedy observes:
Although it is easy to think of international affairs as a rolling sea of politics
over which we have managed to throw but a thin net of legal rules, in truth
the situation today is more the reverse. There is law at every turn – and
only the most marginal opportunities for engaged political contestation.21
15 Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘Governing the Global Economy through Government Networks’,
in Michael Byers (ed.), The Role of Law in International Politics: Essays in International
Relations and International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 177–205, at 204.
16 Jonathan I. Charney, ‘Transnational Corporations and Developing Public International
Law’ (1983) 4 Duke Law Journal 748–88.
17 Christine Chinkin, ‘Human Rights and the Politics of Representation: Is There a Role for
International Law’, inMichael Byers (ed.),The Role of Law in International Politics (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2000), 131–48.
18 Judith Goldstein et al., ‘Introduction: Legalization and World Politics’ (2000) 54 Interna-
tional Organization 385–99.
19 For an engagement with and critique of this theoretical framework, see Chapter 7 in this
volume; André Nollkaemper, ‘The Process of Legalisation after 1989 and Its Contribu-
tion to the International Rule of Law’, in James Crawford and Sarah Nouwen (eds), Select
Proceedings of the European Society of International Law (Oxford: Hart, 2012) 89–102;
Friedrich Kratochwil, The Status of Law inWorld Society: Meditations on the Role and Rule
of Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).
20 James Crawford and Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Introduction’, in James Crawford and Martti
Koskenniemi (eds), The Cambridge Companion to International Law (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2012), 1–21, at 1.
21 David Kennedy, ‘Challenging Expert Rule: The Politics of Global Governance’ (2005) 27
Sydney Law Review 5–28, at 5.
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In short, international law has moved from being the Buchrecht of eso-
teric academics, to occupying a central position in diplomacy and public
discourse. The question remains, however, what implications the legaliza-
tion of world politics has for political life. For the original proponents of
the legalization argument, the assumption was that the room for politics
consequently narrowed and that conflicts would increasingly be resolved
by or through legal means. As we shall see, however, not only has inter-
national law come to face substantial challenges, the very conception of
international law and politics as a zero-sum game underlying such claims
is fundamentally flawed.22
1.2 The Challenges to International Law
The ‘legalization of world politics’ is only part of the story. As part of its
expansion and deepening, international law has also been confrontedwith
certain structural and political challenges. First, the picture of legal cod-
ification has been questioned by those emphasizing the continued blind
spots, gaps and inefficiencies. Critics have correctly pointed out that inter-
national law has yet to find satisfactory solutions to some of the world’s
most pressing problems.Globalization has broughtwith it a range of issues
that do not easily fit the ordering categories of international law as tradi-
tionally defined. International law has thus struggled to respond to chal-
lenges brought on by e.g. climate change, global economic flows, corpo-
rate power and new forms of governance, each of which remain caught
between the need for dynamic regulation and the traditional principles
of sovereignty still underpinning international law. Moreover, breaches
of international law continue to flourish in many areas. This is particu-
larly evident in the area of international humanitarian law and human
rights, where an obvious gap exists between rights and realities. Despite
important developments, some human rights treaties are still associated
with weak or selective monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, mak-
ing the effect of ratifying human rights treaties no guarantee for actual
implementation.23 Despite the flurry of litigation, economists similarly
disagree whether investment treaties actually deliver foreign investments.
If we do live an era of legalization, this is still very much work in progress.
Secondly, the expansion of international law has also created concerns
that international lawmay be losing internal coherence. The decentralized
22 See further Chapter 2, this volume.
23 Kingsbury, ‘InternationalCourts’, pp. 203–27;OonaHathaway, ‘BetweenPower andPrinci-
ple: An IntegratedTheory of International Law’ (2005) 71University of Chicago LawReview
469–536.
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structure of international law means that the proliferation of treaty law
and international judicial institutions have not developed in the system-
atic fashion imagined by the international law’s founding fathers. Rather,
specialized regimes, functional differentiation and multiple fora for adju-
dication have emerged in a non-hierarchical setting, carrying with them
an increased potential for conflicts between different bodies of law and
centres of legal authority.24 Conflicts may be sought resolved through tri-
bunals, committees and commissions, but international law itself far from
always provide clear solutions.25 Concerns have been raised that growing
fragmentation of international law will create normative incoherence.26
While such concerns are hardly new,27 international law has arguably
become a much more messy place, harder for lawyers and judges to sys-
tematize andmore demanding for states to navigate. For some this is both
a natural and preferable outcome of an inherently pluralist international
legal order.28 For others this has led to calls for constitutionalism and
the establishment of clearer hierarchies and enforcement mechanisms as
known from national legal systems.29
Third, and perhaps most important, the political backlash to the
increased influence of international law has become undeniable. States
have voiced repeated concerns that international law is imposing unre-
alistic burdens and that international legal institutions are undermin-
ing democratic decision making and national sovereignty.30 In Europe,
several states have criticized its two regional courts, The Court of Jus-
tice of the European Union (CJEU) and the European Court of Human
24 Karin J. Alter and Sophie Meunier, ‘The Politics of International Regime Complexity’
(2009) 7(1) Perspectives on Politics 13–24; Fischer-Lescano, Andreas and Gunther Teub-
ner, ‘Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global
Law’ (2004) 25Michigan Journal of International Law 999–1046; Margaret A. Young (ed.),
Regime Interaction in International Law. Facing Fragmentation (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2012); Joost Pauwelyn, ‘The Rule of Law without the Rule of Lawyers?
Why Investment Arbitrators Are from Mars, Trade Panelists Are from Venus’ (2015) 109
American Journal of International Law 761–805.
25 J. Klabbers and T. Piiparinen (eds), Normative Pluralism and International Law: Exploring
Global Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 7.
26 Martti Koskenniemi and Päivi Leino, ‘Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern
Anxieties’ (2002) 15 Leiden Journal of International Law 553–79.
27 W. Jenks, ‘The Conflict of Law-Making Treaties’ (1953) 30 British Yearbook of International
Law 401–453.
28 Nico Krisch, Beyond Constitutionalism: The Pluralist Structure of Postnational Law
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).
29 JanKlabbers, Anne Peters andGeirUlfstein,TheConstitutionalization of International Law
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).
30 Ivan Anthony Shearer, ‘In Fear of International Law’ (2005) 12 Indiana Journal of Global
Legal Studies 345–78.
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Rights (ECtHR), for ‘judicial activism’ and overly dynamic interpretation,
not least in regard to sensitive political issues such as welfare distribu-
tion, immigration and minority rights.31 In 2016, the Danish Supreme
Court, in clear defiance of the interpretation of the CJEU, reasserted the
pre-eminence of Danish domestic law in a case concerning employment
rights.32 Resistance to the jurisdiction of the CJEU similarly played a
prominent role in the UK campaign to leave the European Union, just
as it has in the ensuring negotiations of the Brexit process.33 In the US,
the Trump administration announced withdrawals from both the Trans-
Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPPA) on trade and the Paris Agreement
on climate change, in addition to introducing a moratorium on new mul-
tilateral treaties.34
In sum, while we have seen an expansion and deepening of interna-
tional codification and judicial institutions that place international law
at the heart of international politics, any ‘liberal progressive narrative’35
must also take account of the mounting challenges to international law.
International law far from always deliver on its promises. It does not
necessarily resolve internal or external conflicts. Last, but not least, in a
number of areas the international law has developed to a point where
states feel threatened by their own creation. Never before has international
law been so important, and never before subject to such intense political
contestation.
31 Mark Dawson, B. De Witte and Elise Muir (eds), Judicial Activism at the European Court
of Justice (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2013); Mikael Rask Madsen, ‘The Challeng-
ing Authority of the European Court of Human Rights’ (2016) 79 Law and Contemporary
Problems 141–78.
32 Mikael Rask Madsen, Henrik Palmer Olsen and Urska Sadl, ‘Competing Supremacies and
Clashing Institutional Rationalities: The Danish Supreme Court’s Decision in the Ajos
Case and the National Limits of Judicial Cooperation’ 23 European Law Journal, Issue 1–2,
pp. 140–150.
33 As noted by Theresa May in her speech at Lancaster House on 17 January 2017, ‘We
will take back control of our laws and bring an end to the jurisdiction of the Euro-
pean Court of Justice in Britain. Leaving the European Union will mean that our laws
will be made in Westminster, Edinburgh, Cardiff and Belfast. And those laws will be
interpreted by judges not in Luxembourg but in courts across this country’. Avail-
able at www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-governments-negotiating-objectives-for-
exiting-the-eu-pm-speech.
34 Jack L. Goldsmith, ‘The Trump Onslaught on International Law and Institutions’, Lawfare
Blog, 17 March 2017. Available at www.lawfareblog.com/trump-onslaught-international-
law-and-institutions; Monica Hakimi, ‘International Law in the Age of Trump’, EJIL:Talk!,
28 February 2017. Available at www.ejiltalk.org/international-law-in-the-age-of-trump.
35 TilmannAltwicker andOliver Diggelmann, ‘How Is Progress Constructed in International
Legal Scholarship?’ (2014) 25 European Journal of International Law 425–44.
available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108349420.002
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Vrije Universiteit, on 15 Dec 2020 at 12:19:14, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use,
introduction 9
1.3 Changing Politico-Legal Practices
The above characterization of simultaneous proliferation and growing
challenges to international law are often presented as separate narratives
or world views on the status of international law in contemporary society,
and dealt with in isolation by legal and political scholars alike. In contrast,
this volume aims to explore the interplay between these two dynamics
and its implications for the development of international law.While other
works have focused onwhat these developmentsmean for the role of inter-
national courts,36 international organizations37 or private actors,38 such
as transnational corporations or individuals, our focus is on how states as
the original masters navigate the increasingly complex international legal
order in which they find themselves embedded.
The starting premise for our analysis is that in this expanded web of
bilateral and multilateral treaties, internationally empowered institutions
and arbitrational bodies, the room for politics outside international law
has arguably diminished. For the vast majority of states today, global gov-
ernance means that international law has increasingly become a sine qua
non for doing politics. At the same time, the shackles of international law
have leftmany states eager to recoup sovereign power in areas of particular
political importance. In extreme cases, this may lead states to resign from
existing multilateral agreements. Yet, although the UK leaving the Euro-
pean Union, or the US abandoning the TPPA may well have deep-seated
implications for the development of international law also beyond these
specific regimes, it is far from clear that they spell a diminished role for
international law as such. In their wake, different forms of international
law are likely to emerge, spinning a web of bilateral and intergovernmen-
tal agreements. As several of the chapters point to, we may be seeing a
qualitative transformation of international law towards different andmore
‘disaggregated’ forms of international cooperation.39
At the same time, however, the multiplication of legal regimes, overlap-
ping jurisdictions and shifting centres of authority seems to have opened
up an increased playing field for political contestationwithin international
36 See e.g. Karen Alter, The New Terrain of International Law: Courts, Politics, Rights
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).
37 See e.g. Jan Klabbers, ‘Two Concepts of International Organization’ (2005) 2 International
Organizations Law Review 277–94.
38 See e.g. Andrew Clapham,Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2006).
39 This terminology comes from Chapter 6, this volume.
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law. As states are increasingly required to translate and justify their actions
in legal terms,40 governments have becomemuchmore adept at navigating
and manoeuvring legal structures. When governments rely more heavily
on their legal advisors,41 it is not just to ensure compliance with interna-
tional law or to successfully stake their claims as part of legal challenges,
but also to resort to what might be called ‘creative legal thinking’.42
As H. L. A. Hart famously noted, international obligations are by def-
inition ‘open-textured’, and interpretation thus often depends on gen-
eral principles, transnational adjudication and state practice.43 Norma-
tive developments in the form of further codification, adjudication and
soft law are often assumed to remedy this problem by further clarify-
ing interpretation. As international law has developed, however, it could
well be argued that this may also work in reverse. The multiplication of
legal regimes, overlapping jurisdictions and diffusion of authority also
provides for more conflicts within and between international law. This
in turn opens up an increased room for political manoeuvring in rela-
tion to international law, where governments are able to apply a pick-and-
choose approach across different legal regimes, standards and adjudica-
tory venues. International law in this sense is not only regulating and con-
straining but also enabling, legitimizing and constituting certain politics,
often unforeseen and far removed from the original intentions behind
the particular legal regimes and instruments in question. From migra-
tion control, to surveillance and trading of emission and fishing quotas,
states are increasingly designing policies and actions to work at the fringes
or in between the mazes of international law, exploiting interpretative
uncertainties, reverting on soft law standards, or establishing novel cate-
gories and concepts on the basis of domestic or other parts of international
law.
The range of these practices is broad, not only in terms of the differ-
ent issue areas where they can be observed, but also in terms of the kind
of strategies that may be identified. At the more general level at least six
40 Ian Johnstone, The Power of Deliberation: International Law, Politics and Organizations
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
41 Kennedy, ‘Challenging Expert Rule’, 5; see also Anna Leander and Tanja Aalberts, ‘Intro-
duction: The Co-Constitution of Legal Expertise and International Security (Symposium)’
(2013) 26 Leiden Journal of International Law 783–92.
42 Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen, ‘The Role of International Refugee Law in Refugee Policy’
(2014) 27 Journal of Refugee Studies 574–95.
43 H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), 121–44; Brian Bix,
‘H.L.A. Hart and the “Open Texture” of Language’ (1991) 10 Law and Philosophy 51–72.
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different types of strategies may be identified, which are used across dif-
ferent issues areas.
A first set of practices relates to the strategic use of extra-territorial
venues – often termed jurisdiction shopping – in the attempt to shift or
avoid legal liability under either domestic or international law. For exam-
ple, since the 1990s states have interdictedmigrants on the high seas, argu-
ing that this nullified any right to claim asylum as a matter of interna-
tional refugee or human rights law, as the asylum seekers would never
reach their territories.44 It can also involve deals to make use of another
state’s territory. Transnational law enforcement and detention has simi-
larly been used to disclaim sovereign obligations in relation to domestic
due process guarantees or international human rights.45 This may involve
the concomitant commercialization of sovereignty by the territorial state,
as in the case of Guantanamo Bay, where a bilateral agreement is drawn
up ‘renting’ parts of Cuban territory to the US.46 Or it may involve more
complex arrangements between multiple states, as in the case of the CIA
rendition programme. Jurisdiction shopping may also be pursued in rela-
tion to commercial interests. States may thus be seen to negotiate agree-
ments to allow industrial manufacturing in third countries with fewer or
lower environmental and labour rights restrictions. The effort to establish
national fishing quotas as a matter of international law has thus equally
seen a number of southern European states negotiate agreements with its
African neighbours to allow European trawlers to fish within their terri-
torial waters and exclusive economic zones.47
Closely related to jurisdiction shopping, states may also be seen to
engage in international cooperation for the purpose of circumventing or
shifting particular legal obligations. As in the above case, the argument is
that the active, or even nominal, involvement of another state’s authori-
ties can be used to either avoid legal liability on behalf of the sponsoring
state, or to circumvent constraints otherwise posed by international law.
Examples of such outsourcing between states are rife across various issues
44 A practice subsequently accepted to entail jurisdiction as a matter of international human
rights. Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen, ‘Sale’s Legacy – “Creative Legal Thinking” and
Dynamic Interpretation of Refugee Law’, Opinio Juris, 15March 2014. Available fromwww
.opiniojuris.org. See further Chapter 8, this volume.
45 See more generally, Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen and Jens Vedsted-Hansen (eds),Human
Rights and the Dark Side of Globalization: Transnational law enforcement and migration
control (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016).
46 See Chapter 3, this volume.
47 Francisco Orrego Vicuna, The Changing International Law of High Seas Fisheries
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
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of law enforcement. Some states have thus been known to send terrorist
suspects to partner states in order to effect interrogations with techniques
that would not be allowed in the sponsoring state under either domestic
or international law. In both the Pacific and the Americas deals have
similarly been struck to involve third state authorities in efforts to com-
bat international crime, and in particular drug smuggling, thereby cir-
cumventing the obvious constraints otherwise posed by international law
when intercepting suspected smuggling vessels on the high seas or carry-
ing out raids inside the territory of another state. It may equally involve
joint or concerted actions.48 The use of ship-riders – authorities of a ter-
ritorial or neighbouring state – has thus become increasingly popular in
the area of both migration control and efforts to stop drug smuggling.49
Similarly, countries such as Denmark have routinely involved British sol-
diers when undertaking military patrols in Iraq in the attempt to avoid
triggering any direct human rights obligations when taking persons into
custody.50
The expansion of international law has also encountered a transfor-
mation of international politics through the process of new governance
patterns, including the outsourcing of governmental functions to private
actors. Hence another set of political-legal strategies makes use of (and
contributes to) the shifting boundaries between public and private author-
ities. The practice of states to contract privatemilitary companies has been
an increasingly common practice, raising a number of different issues
in terms of state responsibility and accountability under both domes-
tic and international law.51 Private security companies have similarly
been employed by maritime companies and in the context of anti-piracy
operations.52 Privatization has similarly become popular in the area of
48 Douglas Guilfoyle, Shipping Interdiction and the Law of the Sea(Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2009).
49 Ibid., p. 72ff.
50 AndersHenriksen, ‘Fanger, folkeret og ”brite-finter”’ [Detainees, international law and ‘the
British Trick’] (2014) 87 Økonomi & Politik 6–15.
51 Anna Leander, ‘The Paradoxical Impunity of Private Military Companies: Authority and
the Limits to Legal Accountability’ (2010) 41 Security Dialogue 467–90; A. Claire Cutler,
‘The Legitimacy of Private Transnational Governance: Experts and the TransnationalMar-
ket for Force’ (2010) 8 Socio-Economic Review 157–85; Carsten Hoppe, ‘Passing the Buck:
State Responsibility for Private Military Companies’ (2008) 19 European Journal of Inter-
national Law 989–1014.
52 John J. Pitney Jr and John-Clark Levin, Private Anti-Piracy Navies: Warships for Hire
Are Changing Maritime Security (Plymouth, UK: Lexington Books, 2013); Jill Harrelson,
‘Blackbeard Meets Blackwater: An Analysis of International Conventions That Address
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migration, where private actors have taken on a broad range of migra-
tion management functions, from visa issuance and migration control, to
the operation of detention facilities and carrying out deportations.53 The
widespread use of carrier sanctions legislation – fining airlines and other
transportation companies for bringing in unauthorized passengers – is
perhaps the clearest example of how private actors are routinely taking
on migration control functions through a legal construction that effec-
tively distances the state from any associated human rights responsibility.
Often these arrangements involve several layers of subcontracting, or take
place as part of extra-territorial operations, thereby further complicating
questions of accountability and the possibility to ‘pass the buck’ for any
subsequent wrongdoing.54
A third strategy involves what might be called regime or treaty shop-
ping. Whereas the strategies above both seek to exploit jurisdictional
differences in terms of regulation, regime shopping is premised on a func-
tional logic and the co-existence of multiple, partly overlapping and non-
hierarchical treaty regimes. International regime complexity55 means that
issues can be dealt with via multiple regimes, nested in different institu-
tional arrangements, and with different responsibilities towards different
parties. For instance, the issue of intellectual property rights is regulated
via the WTO’s trade regime through the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), but is also addressed by
the World Health Organisation (for instance in case of patented phar-
maceuticals in the fight against HIV/Aids in developing countries), and
the Convention on Biological Diversity. The latter enables the subordi-
nation of intellectual property rights to environmental protection and
development goals, which goes against the TRIPS arrangements.56 The
Piracy and the Use of Private Security Companies to Protect the Shipping Industry’ (2010)
25 American University International Law Review 283.
53 Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen, ‘Private Security and the Migration Control Industry’, in
Rita Abrahamsen and Anna Leander (eds), Routledge Handbook on Private Security (New
York: Routledge, 2015), 207–217.
54 Carsten Hoppe, ‘Passing the Buck: State Responsibility for Private Military Companies’
(2008) 19 European Journal of International Law 989–1014.
55 Alter andMeunier, ‘The Politics of International RegimeComplexity’; cf. Kal Raustiala and
David Victor, ‘The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources’ (2004) 85 International
Organization 277–309.
56 Raustiala and Victor, ‘The Regime Complex’; Laurence R. Helfer, ‘Regime Shifting; the
Trips Agreement and the New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property Making’
(2004) 29 Yale Journal of Intenational Law 1–81. Raustiala and Victor push the argument
even further and identify this as a practice of ‘strategic inconsistency’, which is the creation
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dynamics of regime complexity are further enhanced by the expansion of
‘soft law’ instruments, such as declarations, guidelines, standard-setting
and recommendations.57
Following on from this, states may fourthly seek to resolve legal con-
flicts at the judicial venues where they expect the most favourable view
on the legal case, or where the underlying legal regime at both primary
and secondary level may work most to their benefit – what might be
called judicial forum shopping. Again, the room for such practices has
increased as a result of the proliferation of international arbitration bod-
ies with partly overlappingmandates. For instance, North American trade
disputes can be brought to either the WTO or to NAFTA, which will
then have a different effect of precedence, and be binding upon differ-
ent partners. Judicial forum shopping, hence, is not only about winning
a particular case, but can also be about discriminating among overlap-
ping memberships58 in light of a legal ‘shadow of the future logic’. Judicial
forum shopping is not only a matter of strategic choice at the moment of
decision where to file your case, but can also involve the simultaneous or
successive litigation of claims.59
A fifth aspect of political manoeuvring relates to interpretive framing
more generally. As noted above, international law, in particular, tends to be
‘open-textured’, and interpretation thus often depends on general princi-
ples, soft law, transnational adjudication and state practice. As such, inter-
pretation and framing is inherent in the operation of law. In the expan-
sive developments of international law, the potential for conflicts further
multiply, and international law itself far from always provides clear-cut or
singular solutions to solve them. Yet, interpretative framing is not only
a matter of stating your case before the court or in international diplo-
macy. Madeleine Albright’s famous suggestion to Robin Cook ‘to get new
lawyers’ in order to justify the unilateral intervention in Kosovo illustrates
the partisan function of advocacy and apology that legal advisors often
of contradictory rules in parallel regimes in order to undermine existing rules in other
agreements.
57 Cf. mapping of the regime complex for climate change in Robert O. Keohane and David G.
Victor, ‘The Regime Complex for Climate Change’ (2011) 9 Perspectives on Politics 7–23.
58 Mark L. Busch, ‘Overlapping Institutions, Forum Shopping, and Dispute Settlement in
International Trade’ (2007) 61 International Organization 735–61.
59 Laurence R. Helfer, ‘Forum Shopping for Human Rights’ (1999) 148University of Pennsyl-
vania Law Review 285–400. He does not see this as a threat to the unity of the legal system
but rather emphasizes the aforementioned practice of interdecision making which makes
international human rights litigation a ‘shared and ongoing enterprise’ producing ‘harmo-
nious, though not necessarily uniform, set of human rights standards’ (ibid., at 400).
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occupy.60 Indeed, it is a hallmark of a good lawyer that s/he can provide a
valid legal argumentation for either position in a dispute, which is some-
times what governmental legal advisors are expected to do.61 At its most
extreme, this practice of lawyering as part of high politics is sometimes
referred to as ‘lawfare’.62 It illustrates that the formalist and categorical
distinction between lawmaking and its subsequent application ignores the
interpretive aspect of any linguistic activity, and naively assumes that law
can speak for itself. At the same time, it is precisely international law’s
appearance of objectivity that makes it such a powerful tool for the pur-
suit and legitimation of political objectives.63
Last, but not least, deference to other forms of non-legal expertise
may be considered a distinct political-legal strategy in this connec-
tion. Although not directly a practice of creatively manoeuvring interna-
tional law itself, the role of technical and scientific expertise has become
an ingrained aspect of much legal discourse today.64 In order to set-
tle disputes in international environmental law or various jurisdictional
and exploitation claims under the Law of the Sea, specialized technical
knowledge concerning respectively emissions or the determination of e.g.
equidistance principles and underwater geology is required. Rather than
only lawyers, it is more and more scientists that are called into the court-
room to provide scientific evidence to support a given case. This techni-
calization has in some instances led to the privatization of legal rulemak-
ing and dispute settlement, for instance in the case of internet domains
to the International Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers.65
This ‘politics of (legal) expertise’66 is thus another interesting example
60 James Rubin, ‘Countdown to a Very Personal War’, Financial Times, 30 September 2000.
61 Shirley V. Scott, International Law in World Politics: An Introduction (Boulder, CO: Lynne
Rienner, 2010), 138n9. See also the special issue on the role of legal advisers in foreign
policy making in (1991) 2 European Journal of International Law.
62 David Kennedy, Of War and Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); Wouter G.
Werner, ‘TheCuriousCareer of Lawfare’ (2010) 43CaseWestern Reserve Journal of Interna-
tional Law 61–72; Pascal Vennesson and Nikolas M. Rajkovic, ‘The Transnational Politics
of Warfare Accountability: Human Rights Watch versus the Israel Defense Forces’ (2012)
26 International Relations 409–29.
63 Scott, International Law in World Politics, Chapter 7. 64 Chapter 7, this volume.
65 Gillian K. Hadfield, ‘Privatizing Commercial Law: Lessons from ICANN’ (2002) 6 Journal
of Small and Emerging Business Law, 257–288; A. Claire Cutler, ‘The Legitimacy of Pri-
vate Transnational Governance: Experts and the Transnational Market for Force’ (2010) 8
Socio-Economic Review 157–85.
66 Leander andAalberts, ‘TheCo-Constitution of Legal Expertise and International Security’;
Wouter G. Werner, ‘The Politics of Expertise: Applying Paradoxes of Scientific Expertise
to International Law’, in Monika Ambrus et al. (eds), The Role of Experts in International
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of manoeuvring in which legal objectivity is boosted with supposed-
scientific objectivity.
These forms of extralegal deferral are of interest here because they
implicitly define the boundaries between what fall under the remits of
international law.67 Whereas this entails a formal authority question (cf.
the US Act of State doctrine),68 it is also linked to questions of differ-
ent kinds of expertise. For instance, in the Targeted Killings case, the
US District Court of Columbia dismissed the case on the basis of the
constitutional division of power and because the issue required ‘exper-
tise beyond the capacity of the Judiciary’.69 Whereas in the case of such
high security issues this is in turn often linked to the availability of
classified evidence,70 international legal questions today are increasingly
subject to a variety of extra-legal expertise, each with their own stan-
dards of what is ‘proportionate’, ‘optimal’ or ‘reasonable’ for the issue at
hand.71
These political-legal strategies form the starting point for exploring the
paradox of increasing legalization increasing the room for politicization
within/of international law through empirical case studies. This typology
should not be considered an exhaustive nor a conclusive list. Focusing on
different legal regimes and issue areas, the various chapters to the volume
each analyze examples of politico-legal manoeuvring enabled by these
regimes. As the case studies show, different strategies are often employed
in combination in relation to a given policy issue.
Decision-Making: Advisors, Decision-Makers or Irrelevant? (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2014).
67 Leander andAalberts, ‘TheCo-Constitution of Legal Expertise and International Security’;
Werner, ‘The Politics of Expertise’.
68 The US Act of State doctrine seeks to exclude matters of foreign policy from judicial
overview by domestic courts. As an avoidance doctrine, under the Act of State judges can
decide to refrain from adjudication to determine the (il)legality of a state’s action, and thus
de facto defer to politics. It runs parallel to the ‘political question’ doctrine, also known as
the non-justiciability principle from the Buttes Gas and Oil case.
69 Cf. Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010), 77. Available at www.ccrjustice
.org/files/2010.12.07_Al-Aulaqi%20Decision_0.pdf.
70 Erna Rijsdijk, ‘The Politics of Hard Knowledge: Uncertainty, Intelligence Failures, and the
“Last Minute Genocide” of Srebrenica’ (2011) 37 Review of International Studies 2221–35;
Gavin Sullivan and Marieke De Goede, ‘Between Law and the Exception: The Un 1267
Ombudsperson as a Hybrid Model of Expertise’ (2013) 26 Leiden Journal of International
Law 833–54.
71 Martti Koskenniemi, ‘The Fate of Public International Law: Between Technique and Pol-
itics’ (2007) 70 Modern Law Review 1–30. Cf example of software engineers who develop
algorythms for drones, Louise Amoore, The Politics of Possibility (Durham, NC: DukeUni-
versity Press, 2013).
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1.4 Implications for International Law
It is important to note that the kind of practices examined in the present
volume are hardly representative of states’ commitment to all aspects of
international law. Henkin’s famous observation that ‘[a]lmost all nations
observe almost all principles of international law and almost all their obli-
gations almost all of the time’ arguably still holds true today, despite recent
challenges to core parts of the international legal corpus.72 The practices
explored in the following chapters rather represent a particular kind of
political response in areas where states feel unduly constrained by inter-
national law in light of important political priorities, and where the two
obvious alternatives – openly disregarding legal obligations or seeking to
renegotiate or step down from international legal instruments – are con-
sidered unfeasible or too costly. What these practices represent is a dif-
ferent way for states to broker the pouvoirs constitué-pouvoirs constituant
dilemma of international law.
Two further points follow from this. The emergence of these practices is
not tantamount to a rejection of international law as such – far from it. In
most cases, policies to e.g. offshore or outsource certain law enforcement
functions in order to avoid incurring correlate legal obligations inter alia
presume that such norms do actually matter and, under ordinary circum-
stances, affect state action. If governments felt they could simply disre-
spect international law ‘at home’, then there would be little need to engage
in cumbersome and often costly schemes to engage in extra-territorial
law enforcement or cooperation with third state authorities. These gov-
ernance strategies are exactly what makes it possible for states to apply a
more managerial approach to international law, but nonetheless still for-
mally present themselves as countries abiding by their international law
commitments.
In much of the existing literature, the different policies listed above
are treated as exceptions or aberrations to the ordinary modus operandi
of international law; something taking place ‘beyond the rule of law’,
in a ‘rights vacuum’ or creating a ‘legal black hole’, where interna-
tional politics trumps international law.73 Such dismissals, however fail to
acknowledge how these practices are in fact enabled by international law
72 Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), 47.
73 See e.g. Johan Steyn, ‘Guantanamo Bay: The Legal Black Hole’ (2004) 53 International and
Comparative Law Quarterly 1–15; Ralph Wilde, ‘Legal “Black Hole”? Extraterritorial State
Action and International Treaty Law onCivil and Political Rights’ (2005) 26Michigan Jour-
nal of International Law 739–806.
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itself.74 Moreover, most, if not all, of these practices are coached and
framed through bilateral or multilateral international legal agreements.
The international law of cooperation, in other words, is the very vessel
through which they are implemented.
More fundamentally, it is important to recognize that these practices are
not merely temporal aberration or exceptions to an idealized idea of the
standard modus operandi of international law, but rather a pervasive and
systematic trait of the international legal system today.75 That is not say
that they are necessarily a new phenomenon. The modern-day contracts
with private security and military companies have their historical precur-
sors in the use of mercenaries and privateers. In the US, carrier sanctions
was first introduced in the 1902 Passenger Act, requiring shipmasters to
sign an affidavit to verify that all passengers were in good physical and
mental health,76 and as early as 1751 Denmark levied fines from shipmas-
ters bringing in Jewish passengers.77 More generally, strategies of interpre-
tative framing and forum shopping have always been part of international
law, just as several historical cases before the International Court of Justice
have hinged on the production of relevant scientific data.78
It is, however, during the most recent decades that such practices
have become more prevalent and more visible, facilitated by the afore-
mentioned development in international law. Developments in interna-
tional law provide both cause and solution. As international legal commit-
ments expand and deepen, states are actively looking for ways to recoup
sovereign manoeuvrability in other ways. At the same time, this very
expansion simultaneously create more opportunities for states to strategi-
cally engage with and seek to navigate international law. International law
has similarly paved the way for changing patterns of governance. Many
of these practices rely on transnational arrangements, allowing states to
74 See e.g. Chapter 3, this volume. See further Fleur Johns, ‘Guantánamo Bay and the Anni-
hilition of the Exception’ (2005) 16 European Journal of International Law 613–35; Fleur
Johns, Non-Legality in International Law: Unruly Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2013).
75 Scott Veitch, Law and Irresponsibility: On the Legitimation of Human Suffering (Abingdon:
Routledge, 2007).
76 AristideZolberg, ‘Matters of State’, inCharlesHirschman, PhilipKasinitz and JoshDeWind
(eds), The Handbook on International Immigration (New York: Russell Sage Foundation,
1999), 71–93, at 75.
77 Martin Schwartz Lausten, Jøder og kristne i Danmark: Fra middelalderen til nyere tid
(Copenhagen: Anis, 2012).
78 See e.g. North Sea Continental Shelf, Germany v. Denmark, International Court of Justice,
ICJ Rep 3, ICGJ 150, 20 February 1969.
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exercise sovereign functions in concert, extra-territorially, through pri-
vate parties or as part of international organizations.
Moreover, it should be underscored that states may well feel politically
justified in this approach. While some of the above examples may seem
to suggest a ‘bad state’ theory akin to Oliver Wendell Holmes’s famous
jurisprudential doctrine,79 in some instances states may have a legitimate
interest in regaining political control against international law. For many
developing countries, creative legal thinking might be a necessary pre-
condition to re-establish public control vis-à-vis international investors,
regardless of how one views such practices.80 Indeed, this and other vol-
umes have shown that developing countries are significantlymore likely to
lose or have less influence in adjudication even after one controls for vari-
ous factors.81 At a more general level, some might argue that the practices
described in this volume ultimately serve a constructive purpose, func-
tioning as a political pressure valve and avoiding more direct confronta-
tions leading to disrespect for or regressive revisions of important areas of
international law.
It should also be remembered that state strategies to avoid or eclipse
legal responsibility are of course far from always successful. While Made-
line Albright’s new lawyers may be argued to have tipped the balance in
the Kosovo war to ‘illegal but legitimate’ in the eyes of the international
community, creative legal thinking did not do the trick for the US, the UK
and their allies in the 2003 Iraq war. While they argued a revival of the
1990s resolutions as the legal basis for an intervention, the overall opin-
ion of the international community and legal scholars was that Resolution
1441 indicated that a second resolution was necessary to authorize the use
of force. However, our focus here is not necessarily on the success of a par-
ticular legal argument, but on which arguments can be made in the first
79 Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr, ‘The Path of the Law’ (1897) 10 Harvard Law Review 457–61;
see further Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen and Jens Vedsted-Hansen, eds, Human Rights
and the Dark Side of Globalisation; Transnational Law Enforcement and Migration Control
(London: Routledge, 2016).
80 See Chapter 4, this volume.
81 See Daniel Behn, Tarald Berge and Malcolm Langford, ‘Poor States or Poor Governance?
Testing Claims of Systemic Bias in Investment Treaty Arbitration’ (forthcoming) North-
western Journal of International Law & Business; Cosette Creamer, ‘Between the Letter of
the Law and the Demands of Politics: The Judicial Balancing of Trade Authority within
the WTO’Working Paper (2015). Note though that Cesare Romano claims that the situa-
tion has as least improved for developing countries compared to the post-war years: Cesare
Romano, ‘International Justice and Developing Countries’ (2002) 1 The Law and Practice
of International Courts and Tribunals 539–611.
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place. Thus we are interested in the boundaries for validity, more than
success, truth or legality as such.82
Moreover, it should not be forgotten that the expansion of international
law has also enhanced the ability of courts and other legal institutions to
reign in such practices. Although the establishment of state responsibil-
ity in such cases are, by design, a far from straightforward matter, those
who proclaim that these practices take place in a legal black hole tend to
overlook the substantial developments in the interpretation of, for exam-
ple, international human rights, international humanitarian law and inter-
national environmental law. In many areas, normative developments and
jurisprudence havemanaged to respond to new policy developments. Sev-
eral policies regarding jurisdiction shopping have thus been successfully
challenged by domestic or international courts, forcing governments to
abandon or substantially adjust their practice. At the same time, however,
this jurisprudence is often politically contested, and itself subject to a host
of different politico-legal strategies.83 What emerges is a dialectic between
normative and policy developments, each driving the other.
By focusing on the above practices of international law, the present vol-
ume seeks to develop two arguments simultaneously: one about inter-
national law as increasingly regulating and constraining international
relations by defining or reconfiguring the parameters of international
political action; the other, about international law as enabling certain poli-
cies that exploit the particularities of international law to recoup and legit-
imize political power. In otherwords, governments appear to have become
both more norm-savvy and more strategic in their relationship to inter-
national law. This is a distinctive form of politics, both constrained and
facilitated by a plethora of international rules and legal institutions.84 It
82 This shifts the inquiry away from the pitfalls of policy-oriented jurisprudence and instru-
mental understandings of international law in its wake, on one side, and of a formalism that
blends out the creativity and the politics of the legal practice, on the other. Tanja E. Aalberts
and Ingo Venzke, ‘Moving Beyond Interdisciplinary Turfwars: Toward an Understanding
of International Law as Practice’, in André Nollkaemper et al. (eds), International Law as
Profession (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 287–310, at 305. On legality as
a form of practice, see Nikolas M. Rajkovic, Tanja E. Aalberts and Thomas Gammeltoft-
Hansen (eds), The Power of Legality: Practices of International Law and Their Politics
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016).
83 See e.g. Chapter 5, this volume.
84 Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, ‘Law, Legalization, and Politics: An Agenda for
the Next Generation of IL/IR Scholars’, in Jeffrey L. Dunoff and Mark A. Pollack (eds),
Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations: The State of
the Art (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 33–56, at 35.
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is this dual dynamic between politics and international law that accounts
for both the success of and challenges to international law in our current
age. These practices are thus not a sign of eroding respect for international
law and cooperation. On the contrary, they should be seen as a systemic
feature of the international legal landscape today, and a logical counter-
move to the growing power of international law and its political and judi-
cial institutions.85
This in turnmeans that international law itself cannot provide the solu-
tion to its shortcomings and challenges through more rules and better
institutions, nor can social science models that only seek to determine
international law’s effectiveness through analysis and prediction of state
behaviour. Rather, the very paradox of international law is like grannie’s
crochet blanket: the more layers you add, the more holes or gaps emerge.
The last decades have seen a tremendous growth in scholarly literature
seeking to theorize the politics of international law from different per-
spectives. While this body of literature carries many important insights
as reflected above and in the following chapters, the starting point for
the present volume is deliberately inductive. Each chapter is based on an
empirical mapping and overview of contrasting developments in inter-
national law, from which we build our analytical framework. Such an
approach may be seen to share certain affinities with other recent schol-
arship, including the call for ‘empirical’ and ‘anti-formalist’ approaches to
international law forwarded by e.g. new legal realism,86 as well as the turn
to ‘practice theory’87 as a counter-strategy to the a priori theorizing that
has characterized much of the literature at the intersection between inter-
national law and International Relations. The contributors to this volume,
however, represent scholars from a broad church of international legal
theory. For the present project, we have thus adopted a more pluralistic
approach with the hope of opening up space for more fruitful academic
exchange in light of recent developments in international law.
1.5 Structure of the Volume
The ensuing chapters to this volume are all empirically grounded; each
chapter seeking to analyze the various ways in which states have made
85 See further Chapter 2, this volume.
86 See e.g. Jakob Holtermann and Mikael Rask Madsen, ‘European New Legal Realism and
International Law: How toMake International Law Intelligible’ (2015) 28 Leiden Journal of
International Law 211–30, as well as other articles in this special issue on new legal realism.
87 Rajkovic, Aalberts and Gammeltoft-Hansen, The Power of Legality.
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creative use of developments of international law and globalization. To
demonstrate the breath and pervasiveness of these practices, we have
included chapters that span a range of different topics, frommigration and
surveillance to foreign investment arbitration and environmental policy,
and a number of different legal regimes, fromEUand international human
rights law to the law of the sea.
As the conceptual backdrop to the empirical observations in this chap-
ter and the case studies, Chapter 2, by Tanja Aalberts and Thomas
Gammeltoft-Hansen, locates the approach of the present volume amidst
different conceptions of the relationship between politics and interna-
tional law within International Law and International Relations. In line
with the empirical and problem-driven approach presented here, the
ambition is not to dictate one particular theoretical framework upon the
case studies, but rather to open up dialogue across theoretical orienta-
tions and academic disciplines about the role of international law in con-
temporary world politics. To this end, the chapter employs the notion
of sovereignty games as a heuristic to unpack the relationship between
sovereignty, international law and politics.
The following chapter, by Margareta Brummer, aims to expose the
structure of the formation process of the extra-territorial location. It
retraces how three particular geographical zones – the Guantanamo Bay
detention centre, the military base of the US in Diego Garcia and the CIA-
led prison in Poland – are rendered extra-territorial by a tripartite process
of abandonment, construction and denial in form of creative legal argu-
mentation. Her chapter argues that the formation of a zone can always be
articulated with the territorial-legal vocabulary that serves the actors in
the fulfilment of their aims and preferences, while discarding those argu-
ments that do not fit their aims. International law should thus be seen as
complicit in creating regular instances of territorialization.
The development of the modern investment treaty regime represents a
remarkable extension of international law in the post-war period. How-
ever, the development of this regime has precipitated a backlash from var-
ious states, civil society actors and scholars over the past decade, particu-
larly on account of the explosion of litigation by foreign investors against
host states. Many of these investment treaty arbitrations have resulted in
sizeable compensation awards for actions thatmany states believe are both
legitimate and within their exclusive purview as sovereigns. This tension
between the rights afforded to private foreign investors under interna-
tional treaties and the legitimate rights of sovereign states to regulate in
the public interest of their domestic citizenry has culminated in efforts
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by states to weaken the regime. In Chapter 4, Malcolm Langford, Daniel
Behn and Ole Kristian Fauchald analyze the strategies and tactics, partic-
ularly those of a more questionable nature, that states are employing to
scale back the unintended consequences of the international investment
regime while simultaneously claiming adherence to its international legal
obligations.
Chapter 5, by Moritz Baumgärtel, examines state strategies in relation
to the EuropeanCourt ofHumanRights and the Court of Justice of the EU
in regard to cases concerningmigrants and asylum seekers. This represent
one of, if not the, most difficult and pressing issues before the two courts.
The current refugee crisis and the ascendance of a right-wing political cli-
mate have created a volatile situation in which European governments
increasingly enact legally questionable policies, which in turn are being
challenged before the two European courts. Looking at recent cases, this
chapter explores how governmentsmaximize their ‘sovereignmanoeuvra-
bility’ when confronted with European-level litigation. It describes four
different strategies of ‘managing’ and containing the impact of such rul-
ings: legal argumentation about the scope of the relevant instruments,
policy implications and procedural requirements; ‘anticipatory measures’
aiming to strike out cases or to contain public reactions to adverse rul-
ings; ‘peer mobilization’ exerting collective pressure on the courts; and
post-judgment positioning vis-à-vis the judgment or the court in ques-
tion. The chapter thereby highlights how changing practices of interna-
tional law require more differentiated evaluations even of the influence of
strong and assertive international judicial bodies such as the two Euro-
pean courts.
In the following chapter, ItamarMann takes on the equally thorny issue
of surveillance and examines bilateral and multilateral arrangements for
the collection of signals intelligence between the US’s National Security
Agency and its partner organizations in other countries. He argues that
these arrangements, which at face value appear far removed from the
domain of public international law, in fact embody a particular genre of
transnational lawmaking. They involve the work of lawyers, and include
various soft law instruments that have partaken in a radical disaggrega-
tion of the national security state. While the chapter’s main objectives are
descriptive and analytic, Mann also signals a normative insight: rather
than focusing exclusively on individual rights to privacy, lawyers seeking
to intervene in the emerging transnational law of mass surveillance ought
to focus more on the structural aspects of the agreements that facilitate
it.
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Jaye Ellis focuses on international environmental protection in
Chapter 7. While this is often considered be a highly legalized field, a
closer look reveals a good deal of ambiguity regarding law’s role. Legal
instruments and regimes to address various aspects of environmental pro-
tection have proliferated, but at the same time states have managed to
maintain a reasonably high degree of control over their legal obligations
pertaining to environmental protection. Strategies to manage legal obli-
gations include deference to experts, opportunities for forum shopping by
virtue of a multiplication of self-contained regimes, and inefficiency. This
is in sharp contrast to the functioning of trade disciplines that states have
imposed on their environmental and health standards. As environmen-
tal regimes become more complex and highly specialized, the role of law
loses ground to other forms of expertise, notably scientific and economic.
Legalization turns out to be a thinly disguised managerialism.
Chapter 8, by Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen and Tanja Aalberts, ana-
lyzes the interplay between politics and law in the recent attempts to
strengthen the humanitarian commitment to saving lives of migrants in
the Mediterranean. Despite a long-standing obligation to aid people in
distress at sea, the search and rescue regime has been marred by conflicts
and political stand-offs as states were faced with a growing number of cap-
sizing boat migrants potentially claiming international protection once
on dry land. Attempts to provide a legal solution to these problems have
resulted in a re-spatialization of the high seas, extending the states’ obliga-
tions in the international public domain based on geography rather than
traditional functionalist principles that operated in the open seas. How-
ever, inadvertently, this attempt towards further regulation has simultane-
ously enabled states to instrumentalize international law to barter off and
deconstruct responsibility by reference to traditional norms of sovereignty
and the law of the sea. In other words, states may be seen to skilfully navi-
gate the different waters of international law themselves in order to recoup
sovereign power.
The final chapter recapitulates the main findings of the substantive
chapters and their relationship to the overall argument of the volume.
One argument going through all chapters is that in order to understand
the seemingly contradictory developments of international law today, we
need to take a step back and pay more attention to how strategic naviga-
tion of rules is facilitated by international law itself. The second section
of the chapter sets out to outline a possible research agenda on this basis.
At the most immediate level, this relates to nuancing and expanding the
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attempted typology set out in this chapter, as well as expanding the empir-
ical gaze to include other pertinent issues, such as international tax regu-
lation, the law of armed conflict and the current claims for resources and
navigation rights in theArctic.More generally, such an agenda emphasizes
more empirical approaches to the study of international law as a strategy
to accommodate different theoretical orientations and explanatory frame-
works.
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